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121-123; obtained by Carter-Brezhnev
Project; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]
Transcript of Telephone Conversation
Between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin
and Afghan Prime Minister Nur
Mohammed Tarki, 17 or 18 March 1979
Kosygin: Ask Comrade Taraki, perhaps
he will outline the situation in Afghanistan.
Taraki: The situation is bad and get-
ting worse.
Kosygin: Do you have support among
the workers, city dwellers, the petty
bourgoisie, and the white collar workers in
Herat? Is there still anyone on your side?
Taraki: There is no active support on
the part of the population. It is almost
wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans
- follow not the heathens, but follow us. The
propaganda is underpinned by this.
Kosygin: Are there many workers
there?
Taraki: Very few—between 1,000 and
2,000 people in all.
Kosygin: What are the prospects?
Taraki: We are convinced that the en-
emy will form new units and will develop
an offensive.
Kosygin: Do you not have the forces
to rout them?
Taraki: I wish it were the case.
Kosygin: What, then, are your propos-
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 145
als on this issue?
Taraki: We ask that you extend practi-
cal and technical assistance, involving
people and arms.
Kosygin: It is a very complex matter.
Taraki: Iran and Pakistan are working
against us, according to the same plan.
Hence, if you now launch a decisive attack
on Herat, it will be possible to save the revo-
lution.
Kosygin: The whole world will imme-
diately get to know this. The rebels have
portable radio transmitters and will report
it directly.
Taraki: I ask that you extend assistance.
Kosygin: We must hold consultations
on this issue. Do you not have connections
with Iran’s progressives? Can’t you tell
them that it is currently the United States
that is your and their chief enemy? The Ira-
nians are very hostile toward the United
States and evidently this can be put to use
as propaganda. What foreign policy activi-
ties or statements would you like to see com-
ing from us? Do you have any ideas on this
question, propaganda-wise?
Taraki: Propaganda help must be com-
bined with practical assistance. I suggest
that you place Afghan markings on your
tanks and aircraft and no one will be any
the wiser. Your troops could advance from
the direction of Kushka and from the direc-
tion of Kabul. In our view, no one will be
any the wiser. They will think these are
Government troops.
Kosygin: I do not want to disappoint
you, but it will not be possible to conceal
this. Two hours later the whole world will
know about this. Everyone will begin to
shout that the Soviet Union’s intervention
in Afghanistan has begun. If we quickly
airlift tanks, the necessary ammunition and
make mortars available to you, will you find
specialists who can use these weapons?
Taraki: I am unable to answer this ques-
tion. The Soviet advisers can answer that.
Kosygin: Hundreds of Afghan officers
were trained in the Soviet Union. Where
are they all now?
Taraki: Most of them are Moslem re-
actionaries. We are unable to rely on them,
we have no confidence in them.
Kosygin: Can’t you recruit a further
50,000 soldiers if we quickly airlift arms to
you? How many people can you recruit?
Taraki: The core can only be formed
by older secondary school pupils, students,
and a few workers. The working class in
Afghanistan is very small, but it is a long
affair to train them. But we will take any
measures, if necessary.
Kosygin: We have decided to quickly
deliver military equipment and property to
you and to repair helicopters and aircraft.
All this is for free. We have also decided to
deliver to you 100,000 tons of grain and to
raise gas prices from $21 per cubic meter to
$37.
Taraki: That is very good, but let us
talk of Herat. Why can’t the Soviet Union
send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in ci-
vilian clothing? No one will recognize them.
We want you to send them. They could drive
tanks, because we have all these nationali-
ties in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghan
costume and wear Afghan badges and no
one will recognize them. It is very easy
work, in our view. If Iran’s and Pakistan’s
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